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Automobile Inventories and the Fourth
Amendment: South Dakota v. Oppermian.
Questions regarding the constitutionality of automobile searches
made in the course of standard police inventory procedures have long
vexed state and lower federal courts. The Supreme Court of the
United States had consistently avoided important aspects of this issue
in previous fourth amendment cases. In South Dakota v. Opperman
the Court finally considered the right of the police to inventory a
vehicle lawfully in their custody. The result was the upholding of auto-
mobile searches in noninvestigatory situations, applying a reason-
ableness test rather than requiring compliance with the general
warrant requirement of the fourth amendment. This Case Comment
will analyze Opperman in light of previous state and federal court de-
cisions, examine the reasoning and motivations of the various opinions
in the case, and discuss the impact of the decision on future litigation
challenging police inventory procedures. Unhappily, even after Op-
perman Justice Rehnquist's famous yet doleful dictum on the subject
of automobile searches retains its pungency: "[T]his branch of the law
is something less than a seamless web."3
I. THE FACTS
During the early morning hours of December 10, 1973, Donald R.
Opperman's unattended, locked car was parked on the streets of down-
town Vermillion, South Dakota. Local ordinances prohibited such
parking between 2 a.m. and 6 a.m. The automobile was ticketed at
approximately 3 a.m. The citation warned that "[v]ehicles in viola-
tion of any parking ordinance may be towed from the area.
' A
At approximately 10 a.m. a Vermillion metermaid noticed the still
overparked vehicle and issued a second citation. The car's presence
was also reported to police headquarters pursuant to routine procedure.
A police officer went to the overparked vehicle, inspected the tickets,
and made arrangements to have the car towed by a private towing
service.
The car was towed to the city impound lot, which had been the
scene of past incidents of theft from locked vehicles. 5 Noticing several
items of personal property inside the automobile, the officer used a
tool kept by the tow truck operator to unlock tte car. He then secured
1. See, e.g., Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973); Harris v. United States. 390 U.S.
234 (1968); Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967).
2. 96 S. Ct. 3092 (1976).
3. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 440 (1973).
4. 96 S. Ct. at 3095.
5. Id. at 3095 n.l.
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all items in plain view. The officer had no intention of searching for
evidence of crime,6 but the standard department inventory procedure
that he followed called for an examination of the contents of the un-
locked glove compartment. There he found a quantity of marijuana. 7
Although no attempt was made to contact him, Opperman called
for his automobile that afternoon. The police retained the marijuana
that had been discovered in the glove compartment. Subsequently,
Opperman was arrested and charged with possession. His motion to
suppress the evidence as the fruit of an illegal search was denied,
and he was convicted after a jury trial. Opperman was sentenced to
a fine of one hundred dollars and fourteen days in the county jail.
The Supreme Court of South Dakota reversed the conviction, holding
that the evidence was obtained in violation of the fourth amendment's
prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures.8
II. THE COURT'S DECISION
The Supreme Court of the United States reversed the South
Dakota Supreme Court. Four justices joined Chief Justice Burger in
the majority opinion in which the constitutionality of the inventory was
upheld. 9 Justice Powell joined the majority, but also filed a separate
concurrence. Justices Brennan and Stewart joined in a dissent written
by Justice Marshall; Justice White filed his own dissenting statement.
It is interesting to note that one of the five votes in the majority
opinion was that of Justice Stevens, who had only recently assumed
Justice Douglas' seat on the bench. Since Justice Douglas would
certainly have voted with Justice Marshall, 0 the change in personnel
determined the outcome in Opperman.
Automobile inventory cases present courts with three questions.
First, is an automobile inventory a search for purposes of the fourth
amendment?" Second, if it is a search, is a warrant required? Third,
6. Id.
7. Id. at 3095.
8. State v. Opperman, 228 N.W.2d 152 (S.D. 1975), revd sub nor, South Dakota v. Opper-
man, 96 S. Ct. 3092 (1976), reinstated on remand, 247 N.W.2d 673 (S.D. 1976).
9. Justices Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist, and Stevens.
10. Justice Douglas' attitude on this subject was very clear. In his Cooper v. California
dissent he had stated: "These days police often take possession of cars, towing them away when
improperly parked. Those cars are 'validly' held by the police. Yet if they can be searched with.
out a warrant, the precincts of the individual are invaded and the barriers to privacy breached,"
Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 65 (1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting). Justice Douglas' fears
were obviously realized in Opperman.
I1. The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrant,%
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Automobiles are "effects," and thus are protected by the fourth amendment. Cady v. Dom-
browski, 413 U.S. 433, 439 (1973).
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if a warrant is not required, how should the fourth amendment stan-
dard of reasonableness be applied? Prior to Opperman the Supreme
Court of the United States had three times decided issues closely re-
lated to the inventory questions. Cooper v. California,'2 Harris v.
United States,13 and Cady v. Dombrowskit 4 did not, however, provide
clear constitutional guidelines for lower courts to apply in dealing
with automobile inventory questions. Consequently, in answering
these questions the lower courts had weighed the public interest in
community protection against the fourth amendment right of privacy
in a somewhat discordant manner.' 5
In analyzing the constitutionality of automobile inventories, the
Court in Opperman could have adopted one of three approaches,
corresponding to the three questions outlined above. First, by hold-
ing that a noninvestigatory intrusion of an automobile was less than a
search for fourth amendment purposes the Court could have declared
all automobile inventories constitutionally valid. While some prior
case law would have supported such a holding, 16 the Supreme Court
itself in Terry v. Ohio had warned against attributing "too much sig-
nificance to an overly technical definition of 'search' ,17 in deciding
fourth amendment cases. A resolution of the case on this ground
thus seemed unlikely.
A second possible approach would have been to strike down the
search for failure to comply with the warrant clause, since no recog-
nized exception to the warrant clause specifically applied to the facts
of an automobile inventory.'8 This would have effectively ended auto-
mobile inventories as a routine police practice. Some form of ad-
ministrative warrants might have been required, 9 or all intrusions
might have been restricted to the requirements of probable cause
searches.20  Such an extreme approach, however, also seemed un-
likely in light of the Court's recent expansion of the so-called auto-
mobile exception to the warrant requirement.2'
A middle course between these extreme positions was chosen
12. 386 U.S. 58 (1967).
13. 390 U.S. 234 (1968).
14. 413 U.S. 433 (1973).
15. Compare Cabbler v. Superintendent, 528 F.2d 1142 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied 97
S. Ct. 60 (1976), with United States v. Lawson, 487 F.2d 468 (8th Cir. 1973).
16. See text accompanying notes 22-32 infra.
17. 392 U.S. 1, 17 n.15 (1968).
18. See note 41 infra and accompanying text.
19. Cf. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967) (administrative warrant re-
quired for building search carried out by building code inspectors).
20. For a case that appeared to adopt this view, see Mozetti v. Superior Court. 4 Cal.
3d 699, 484 P.2d 84, 94 CaL Rptr. 412 (1971).
21. See generally Note, Warrantless Searches and Seizures of Automobiles, 87 HARV.
L. REV. 835 (1974).
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by the Court. The Court decided in effect that the intrusion was a
search, but that a warrant was not required. The constitutionality
of the inventory in Opperman therefore depended upon its reasonable-
ness. This Case Comment will examine how the Court resolved the
three questions relating to automobile inventories in light of the treat-
ment they had received prior to Opperman.
A. Is an Inventory a Search?
1. The Legal Background
An intrusion must be a search before fourth amendment protec-
tion is invoked. Thus, if a court initially holds that an automobile
inventory is not a search for fourth amendment purposes, the ques-
tions regarding warrants and reasonableness are never reached, and
the inventory is upheld. The leading case applying this approach was
People v. Sullivan.22 An automobile had been lawfully taken into
police custody because of a parking violation in New York City, and
a loaded gun was found in the vehicle during the inventory conducted
by the police prior to impoundment. No warrant had been obtained.
The New York Court of Appeals held that such an inventory was so
far removed from the processes and objectives of criminal law that
it did not come within fourth amendment protection against unrea-
sonable searches.23 In so holding, the court relied upon the definition
of "search" found in the Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure,
which had defined the word in terms of criminal investigation.24
This resolution of the search question was criticized by both
courts25 and commentators. 26  In Terry v. Ohio27 and Camara v.
Municipal Court28 the Supreme Court had strongly suggested that the
fourth amendment protected all invasions by public officers into per-
sonal privacy, not just those based upon suspected criminal activity.
It is the individual's reasonable expectation of privacy that is con-
stitutionally guarded. 29 The Sullivan rationale did find indirect sup-
port, however, in Wyman v. James.30 There the Supreme Court held
that the visitation by a social worker into a welfare recipient's home,
although mandated by statute, did not constitute a fourth amendment
22. 29 N.Y.2d 69, 272 N.E.2d 464, 323 N.Y.S.2d 945 (1971),
23. Id. at 77, 272 N.E.2d at 469, 323 N.Y.S.2d at 952.
24. MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE art. 1, § SS 1.01, sub d. [1] (Tent.
Draft No. 3, 1970).
25. See, e.g., United States v. Lawson, 487 F.2d 468, 472 (8th Cir. 1973).
26. See, e.g., 40 FORD. L. REV. 679, 686-87 (1972).
27. 392 U.S. 1, 16-19 (1968).
28. 387 U.S. 523, 530 (1967).
29. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-52 (1967); see id. at 361 (Harlan, J., con-
curring).
30. 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
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search since it lacked the "traditional criminal law context!'3, of the
fourth amendment. Most lower courts, however, have refused to follow
Sullivan in holding a narrow definition of the word "search" de-in2terminative in the automobile inventory context.
2. The Opinion in Opperman
The Court was not compelled in Opperman to decide the threshold
question of whether the inventory was a search, for the state had
abandoned its contention that it was not a search on oral argument.33
The Court thus assumed without deciding, as it had in Cady v.
Dombrowski34 that the intrusion involved was a search. The Court
avoided the opportunity to be explicit in holding the automobile
inventory a search, perhaps to preserve the validity of decisions such
as Wyman v. James35 in other areas.
36
Although it would have been possible to dispose of the case on
the grounds that the inventory did not constitute a search, the Court's
reluctance to do so, while not explained, can also be accounted for.
The application of an abstract definition of "search" to decide Opper-
man might well have allowed lower courts in subsequent cases to
sanction a constitutionally prohibited result through compliance with a
technical definition. The Court pointed out this danger in Terry v.
Ohio while reviewing the history of "stop and frisk" cases in New
York.37 In Opperman, therefore, the Court rejected the approach of
People v. Sullivan.38 In assuming without deciding that a search was
involved, Opperman was not inconsistent with the language of Camara
v. Municpal Court, in which it had been affirmed that the fourth
amendment was drawn to protect all privacy.39
31. Id. at 317-18.
32. See Miles and Wefing, The Automobile Search and the Fourth Amendment: A
Troubled Relationship, 4 SErON HALL L. REV. 105, 137-38 (1972). They note that more courts
have relied upon the determination that the inventory search is constitutionally reasonable in
declaring such searches valid. For other cases holding that an automobile inventory was not
a search, see People v. Willis, 46 Mich. App. 436, 208 N.W.2d 204 (1973); State v. Wallen,
185 Neb. 44, 173 N.W.2d 372, cert. denied, 399 U.S. 912 (1970).
33. 96 S. Ct. 3092, 3097 n.6 (1976).
34. 413 U.S. 433 (1973).
35. 400 U.S. 309 (1971). See text accompanying notes 30-31 supra.
36. Justice Powell made clear in his concurrence that he did consider the routine auto-
mobile inventory a search, thus explicitly subjecting the inventory to fourth amendment stan-
dards. 96 S. Ct. at 3100.
37. 392 U.S. 1, 17 n.15 (1968).
38. 29 N.Y.2d 69, 272 N.E.2d 464, 323 N.Y.S.2d 945 (1971).
39. 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967).
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B. The Requirement of a Warrant
1. The Legal Background
The Supreme Court decided in Katz v. United States that "search-
es conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by
judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amend-
ment-subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated
exceptions." 40  These exceptions to the warrant requirement, however,
have included at least a partial one for automobile searches.4' The
exception originated in 1925 in Carroll v. United States.42 Carroll
allowed police to stop a moving vehicle and search it without a
warrant when probable cause was present. Chief Justice Taft rea-
soned that "it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the
vehicle can be quickly moved . . . . Based originally upon prac-
ticability, the Carroll exception has been consistently approved and
followed by the Court;44 it has also been subject to expansion. In
the 1970 case of Chambers v. Maroney4 5 the Court permitted a war-
rantless search of an automobile by the police at the station house
based upon probable cause. The defendant had been arrested else-
where, so the search could not be justified as incident to arrest.46
Despite the fact that the automobile was under police control and in
no danger of being moved as in Carroll, the Court reasoned that a
warrant was not necessary, noting that "for the purposes of the Fourth
Amendment, there is a constitutional difference between houses and
cars." 47  Thus, warrants are generally not required for automobile
searches based upon probable cause.48
40. 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
41. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 439 (1973). Other exceptions include hot pursuit,
the plain view doctrine, emergency situation, consent, and searches incident to arrest. United
States v. Mapp, 476 F.2d 67, 76 (2d Cir. 1973), cited in South Dakota v. Opperman, 96 S, Ct.
at 3103 n.10 (Powell, J., concurring). The "stop and frisk" exception of Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1 (1968), should also be included among the list of exceptions.
42. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
43. Id. at 153.
44. See, e.g., Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949); Scher v. United States, 305
U.S. 25 (1938); Husty v. United States, 282 U.S. 694 (1931). For other cases citing Carroll
with approval, see Dyke v. Taylor Implement Mfg. Co., 391 U.S. 216, 221 (1968) and Preston v.
United States, 376 U.S. 364. 366-67 (1964).
45. 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
46. The search could not be justified as incident to an arrest in light of Preston v. United
States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964). In that case defendants were arr.'sted on a vagrancy charge,
and their vehicle was searched without a warrant after being towed to a garage. The Court
struck down the search. Subsequent cases, however, have severely restricted Preston, Today
it stands only for the proposition that such a search cannot be justified as incident to an arrest.
Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 444 (1973). The Court in Opperinan noted that Preston
was thus not applicable to an automobile inventory. 96 S. Ct. at 3099.
47. 399 U.S. 42, 52 (1970).
48. Comment, The Aftermath of Cooper v. California: Warrantless Automobile Searches
in Illinois, 1968 U. ILL. L.F. 401, 409. But see Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443
(1971) (failure to secure valid warrant before searching automobile on private property violated
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In the 1973 case of Cady v. Dombrowski the Court extended the
so-called "automobile warrant exception" to searches that, "for
want of a better term, may be described as community caretaking
functions, totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or ac-
quisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute."
49
In that case the police had searched a vehicle after an accident based
upon a reasonable belief that the driver, an off-duty policeman, had
been carrying a gun in the car. The search was motivated by a desire
"to protect the public from the possibility that a revolver would fall
into untrained or perhaps malicious hands"50 as the result of vandalism
at the impound lot. Although the search discovered evidence of a
crime, the Court held that in such a noninvestigatory situation, the
search was not unreasonable solely because a warrant had not been
obtained.5
This extension of the automobile warrant exception made sense.
The warrant clause was primarily drawn to assure an independent
determination of the sufficiency of probable cause. The Court had noted
in United States v. Lejkowitz that "the informed and deliberate de-
terminations of magistrates empowered to issue warrants .. .are to
be preferred over the hurried action of officers . ..who may happen
to make arrests. 52 In the usual case of a search based upon probable
cause, this evaluation by a neutral magistrate serves a useful purpose.
But when the police are performing a "community caretaking func-
tion" as in Dombrowski, there are no facts for a magistrate to evalu-
ate.53  Thus, the protective purpose of the warrant clause is inap-
plicable in the noncriminal context.54 Lower courts have likewise
agreed that the warrant clause is generally inapplicable in the case of
an automobile inventory.
5
"
2. The Opinion in Opperman
Consideration of the warrant clause began in Opperman with the
fourth amendment despite presence of probable cause) (plurality opinion). The continued
vitality of Coolidge is in doubt. In Opperman the Court quoted extensively from Justice Black's
dissent in that case. See text accompanying notes 159-60 infra. For another case casting
doubt on Coolidge, see Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 593 (1973). By way of contrast,
the Court has continued to follow Chambers and cite it with approval. Texas v. White, 423 U.S.
67 (1975).
49. 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973).
50. Id. at 443.
51. Id. at 448.
52. 285 U.S. 452, 464 (1932).
53. See South Dakota v. Opperman, 96 S. Ct. at 3103 (Powell, J., concurring). Cf.
Comment, The Automobile Search and Cady v. Dombrowski, 20 ViLL. L. RE%'. 147, 176 (1974)
(warrant requirement geared to probable cause determination). See also text accompan)ing
notes 58-59 infra.
54. Cf. Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. at 317 (visits by social service agency to aid re-
cipients not investigative in the traditional criminal law context).
55. See Miles and Wefing, supra note 32, at 139.
1977]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
Court reviewing its inapplicability in previous automobile cases. The
Court pointed out that the fourth amendment has not been as strin-
gently applied to automobiles as to dwellings. There has been a tra-
ditional difference for constitutional purposes between homes and
automobiles, based upon the diminished expectation of privacy asso-
ciated with the latter. This is due to the "obviously public nature
of automobile travel" 56 and the frequent contact with the police, who
must ensure the public safety.57 This difference has resulted in the more
lenient treatment the Court has given automobiles in applying the
warrant clause.
This broad reading of the automobile exception, then, pointed the
way for the resolution of the warrant issue in Opperman. The Court
noted that warrants are linked in the text of the Constitution to the
concept of probable cause: "The standard of probable cause is pe-
culiarly related to criminal investigations . . . . In view of the non-
criminal context of inventory searches, and the inapplicability in such
a setting of the requirement of probable cause, courts have held-and
quite correctly-that search warrants are not required . . . ."5' This
was a reasonable conclusion. It would indeed have been anomalous
to require a warrant when probable cause was not present, since auto-
mobile searches have been largely excepted from the requirement
when probable cause exists. The Court explicitly stated that both
probable cause and warrants were equally "unhelpful" here. "With
respect to noninvestigative police inventories of automobiles . . . the
policies underlying the warrant requirement . . . are inapplicable."
5 9'
When there is no probable cause analysis for the magistrate to make,
there is no need to go before him.
Thus, the Court's rejection of the warrant requirement in Opper-
man rested upon both the benign nature of the intrusion and prior case
law regarding automobiles and the fourth amendment. Quasi-ad-
ministrative automobile searches have been explicitly put beyond the
veil of the warrant clause.60  The Court's discussion further implied,
however, that a warrant ought never be required in a situation lacking
all motive for investigation of criminal activity. Should the Court in
the future transplant the Opperman reasoning regarding warrants out-
side the realm of automobile searches, the warrant clause could be
strictly limited in application to criminal investigation. The potential
conflict with the holding of Camara v. Municipal Court,6 in which
56. 96 S. Ct. 3092, 3096 (1976)..
57. Id.
58. Id. at 3097 n.5.
59. Id.
60. Cf Comment, The Automobile Inventory Search and Cadv v. Dombrowskl, 20 VIL,
L. REV. 147, 178 (1974) (reaching this conclusion based upon Dombrowski).
61. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
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officials investigating alleged building code violations were required to
secure administrative warrants, would be difficult to resolve.
3. Justice Powell's Concurrence
Justice Powell, in his concurrence, examined the applicability
of the warrant clause to automobile inventories in a similar way.
According to Justice Powell, however, there is "no general 'automo-
bile exception' to the warrant requirement. ' 2  In Opperman Justice
Powell reiterated his viewpoint, previously expressed in United States
v. United States District Court, that although the fourth amendment
speaks in general terms of reasonableness, reasonableness ordinarily
depends upon compliance with the warrant requirement of the fourth
amendment.63
Nevertheless, Justice Powell admitted that the interests served by
requiring interposition by a neutral magistrate were not threatened
where, as in Opperman, probable cause was not a relevant factor.6
Further, the warrant clause primarily protects against abuse of police
discretion. Powell suggested that where abuse of discretion was not
a problem due to the presence of a standard procedure, and where
the owner was not present, such an inventory without a warrant was
reasonable under the fourth amendment.65
The central importance of the warrant clause returns, however,
whenever a criminal context is involved. Justice Powell underscored
the importance of pristine motives on the part of the police, as had
the majority opinion.66 The warrant clause was thus inapplicable, as
far as Justice Powell was concerned, only in the narrow set of cases
involving noninvestigatory situations.
C.- The Determination of "Reasonableness"
1. The Legal Background
A concrete standard by which to administer the fourth amend-
ment test of reasonableness apart from the warrant clause has eluded
the courts. The Supreme Court has provided only broad guidelines.
Justice White in Camara v. Municipal Court suggested that in such
cases "there can be no ready test for determining reasonableness
other than by balancing the need to search against the invasion which
62. 96 S. Ct. 3092, 3103 (1976) (PoweU, J., concurring).
63. 407 U.S. 297, 315 (1972), cited in South Dakota v. Oppcrman, 96 S. Ct. 3092, 3102
(1976) (Powell, J., concurring).
64. 96 S. Ct. at 3103.
65. Id. at 3103-04.
66. Id. at 3104.
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the search entails."67 The Court has held in this regard that the inva-
sion entailed in an automobile search is less significant than that en-
tailed in the search of a home or office because the public nature of an
automobile results in a diminished expectation of privacy.6" This
diminished expectation is also due to an automobile's frequent contact
with law enforcement officials and the state's extensive regulation of
motor vehicles and traffic. 69 Even so, "[t]he word 'automobile' is not a
talisman in whose presence the Fourth Amendment fades away.
S., A somewhat diminished expectation of privacy does not com-
pletely foreclose fourth amendment protection; it simply means that in
some cases a search of an automobile might be upheld where a search
of a dwelling might not.
71
Courts have balanced three major justifications for the inventory
procedure against the diminished expectation of privacy associated
with an automobile. These justifications have included the protection
of the police against false claims of theft, the duty of the police to
protect valuables left in the automobile during the owner's absence,
and the protection of the police against potential danger. Many
lower courts have also treated the routine nature of the inventory pro-
cedure as a factor favoring reasonableness.
a. Claims of Theft The police may be liable for claims of theft
if items left in their possession disappear.7 2  Such claims may be bona
fide or spurious. Some courts have upheld inventories as constitution-
ally reasonable because the itemizing of valuables left in an impounded
vehicle affords protection against false claims.7 3  Bona fide claims are
avoided by securing the listed valuables. Critics, however, have
pointed out that an unscrupulous officer might simply avoid listing an
item on the inventory; or an unscrupulous claimant might simply al-
lege that the item was taken by the police during the inventory pro-
cedure. 74  In either case little protection against claims of theft is af-
67. 387 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967). Whether the criteria of reasonableness are to be
evaluated strictly in terms of the facts of each case or whether a more general evaluation is
permissible is a different problem. See text accompanying notes 123-25 infra.
68. Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1973). In that case police examincd the ex-
terior of an automobile for paint chips after having it towed from the parking lot where the
owner had left it prior to his arrest. Despite the presence of probable cause and ample
opportunity to secure a search warrant, no warrant had in fact been obtained. In a plurality
opinion the court held the search constitutional; the diminished expectation of privacy as-
sociated with automobiles excused the lack of a warrant. See 36 Onto ST. L.J. 190 (1975)
69. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 442 (1973).
70. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 461 (1971).
71. Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 589-90 (1973).
72. See Cabbler v. Superintendent, 528 F.2d 1142, 1144 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. dened, 97
S. Ct. 60 (1976).
73. Id.
74. See Comment, Police Inventories of the Contents of Vchicles and the Exchtslonart
Rule, 29 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 197, 204-06 (1972). Justice Powell also noted this possibility
in his concurring opinion in Opperman. 96 S. Ct. at 3101 (Powell, J.. concurring),
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forded. While this rationale is therefore of limited utility,75 courts
have continued to employ it.
b. Protection of Property Inventories have also been justified
by the protection they afford to the owner's property.76 Although
normally not required by statute in the inventory situation specifi-
cally, many states generally charge police with the responsibility for
protecting private property.77  This has had some bearing on the de-
termination of reasonableness. In Harris v. United States8 the Su-
preme Court allowed the admission of evidence that came into plain
view while police were rolling up the windows of an impounded ve-
hicle to protect it and its contents from the rain. The Court deter-
mined both that the question of a search was not presented since the
police were only protecting the automobile and that the "plain view"
exception applied. 79  This case at least suggests that the fourth amend-
ment does not prohibit the police from protecting private property in
their custody. As the Fourth Circuit stated in Cabbler v. Superinten-
dent, "it would be anomalous to find that the Fourth Amendment, de-
signed to insure the sanctity of private possessions, compelled the
police to leave the personal effects of a prisoner . .. scattered in the
street."80
At least two states have held, however, that the police owe the
owner of a vehicle only a duty of slight care as gratuitous bailees.,
This is satisfied by merely rolling up the windows and locking the
doors. Justifying the intrusion as a service to the owner is even more
difficult when his consent is not sought 2 or his protests are ignored. 3
Similar problems arise when the discovery of contraband is not un-
expected. 4 The protection of private property is indeed a significant
protectible interest;85 but, unlike fourth amendment rights, property
75. See South Dakota v. Opperman, 96 S. Ct. 3092, 3101 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring).
See Comment, The Aftermath of Cooper v. California: Warrantless Automobile Searches in
Illinois, 1968 U. IL_ L.F. 401, 408. There the author pointed out the small likelihood of victims
bringing tort suits against police.
76. See United States v. Mitchell, 458 F.2d 960, 961-62 (9th Cir. 1972).
77. Eg., OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 737.11 (Page 1976), which requires the police to "pro-
tect persons and property" generally.
78. 390 U.S. 234 (1968).
79. Id. at 236.
80. 528 F.2d 1142, 1145 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct 60 (1976) (emphasis in
original).
81. South Dakota and California require only a duty of slight care by the police in an
inventory situation. See State v. Opperman, 228 N.W.2d 152, 159 (S.D. 1975); Mozetti v. Supe-
rior Court, 4 CaL 3d 699, 708, 484 P.2d 84, 89-90, 94 CaL Rptr. 412, 417-18 (1971).
82. See Boulet v. State, 17 Ariz. App. 64, 495 P.2d 504 (1972), rev"d sub nom. In re One
1965 Econoline, 109 Ariz. 433, 511 P.2d 168 (1973).
83. See Virgil v. Superior Court, 268 CaL App. 2d 127, 73 Cal. Rptr. 793 (1968).
84. See Gonzales v. State, 507 P.2d 1277 (Okla. Crim. App. 1973). But see United
States v. Kelehar, 470 F.2d 176 (5th Cir. 1972) (inventory upheld although the finding of contraband
not unexpected).
85. South Dakota v. Opperman, 96 S. Ct. 3092, 3107 (1976) (Marshall J., dissenting);
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can be insured against loss, as several commentators have noted.86
Some courts have therefore been reluctant to utilize this rationale,
particularly when the items to be protected are beyond plain view.8
7
c. Protection from Danger The third justification for inven-
tories, protection of the police from danger, has evolved from the
Supreme Court's decision in Cooper v. California.' There the de-
fendant had been arrested for selling heroin, and his car impounded
pending forfeiture proceedings. The police searched the car a week
after its seizure and found incriminating evidence. This evidence was
admitted at trial over the defendant's objection. The Supreme Court
upheld the warrantless search and seizure. Justice Black, writing
for the Court in a five-to-four decision, stated: "It would be unrea-
sonable to hold that the police, having to retain the car in their cus-
tody for such a length of time, had no right, even for their own protec-
tion, to search it," 9 although no danger was apparent. Reliance was
also placed by the Court upon the California forfeiture statute under
which the car was held, which gave some possessory interest short of
legal title to the police, and also upon the close relationship between
the reason for the search and the reason for the arrest.90 One subse-
quent Supreme Court decision, however, stressed solely the protec-
tion from danger rationale as the basis for the determination of rea-
sonableness.9' Although occasional lower courts have dismissed the
danger rationale as "flimsy" and "remote, ' 92 even critics have ad-
mitted it cannot be completely dismissed. 93
d. Routine Nature of the Procedure The Court in Cooper also
stated that "the question here is not whether the search was author-
ized by state law. The question is rather whether the search was rea-
sonable under the Fourth Amendment. 94  Nevertheless, in deter-
mining reasonableness lower courts have given great weight to the
standard nature of automobile inventory practices. In addition to the
Cabbler v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 520, 522, 184 S.E.2d 781, 782 (1971). cert. denied, 405 t1.S
1073 (1972).
86. E.g., Comment, Warrantless Searches and Seizures of Automobiles and the Suplreme
Court From Carroll to Cardwell: Inconsistently Through the Seamless Web, 53 N.C.L. RLV.
722, 761 (1975); Note, Warrantless Searches and Seizures of Automobiles, 87 HARV. L. RLV.
835, 853 (1974).
87. See, e.g., State v. Catlette, 221 N.W.2d 25 (S.D. 1974).
88. 386 U.S. 58 (1967).
89. Id. at 61-62.
90. Id. at 61.
91. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 447 (1973).
92. Boulet v. State, 17 Ariz. App. 64, 69, 495 P.2d 504, 509 (1972), rev'd sub nom. In re
One 1965 Econoline, 109 Ariz. 433, 511 P.2d 168 (1973). For an equally critical discussion,
see State v. Bradshaw, 41 Ohio App. 2d 48, 322 N.E.2d 311 (Wood County 1974).
93. South Dakota v. Opperman, 96 S. Ct. at 3107 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Comment,
Police Inventories of the Contents of Vehicles and the Exclusionary Rule, 29 WAS!. & LtL L,
REV. 197, 203-04 (1972).
94. 386 U.S. 58, 61 (1967).
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other justifications, many have felt that the routine nature of a search
with standardized procedures supports the inference that the inventory
is normally not a subterfuge for warrantless exploration.95
This logic creates an anomaly, for the citizen is protected from
government intrusion only when suspected of criminal activity.
96
When suspicion has risen to the level of probable cause 97 the police
are, of course, entitled to search. And when no suspicion of criminal
activity is present, the police are again entitled to search provided
they follow the standard department procedure. Only a search based
upon suspicion less than probable cause will be prohibited. Many
courts, despite the anomaly, have allowed this to constitute almost
conclusive evidence of reasonableness.9"
Of course, the mere claim of a noninvestigatory motive is subject
to abuse; therefore, some restraint upon the understandable police mo-
tivation to explore for evidence must be provided. The difficulty enters
in drawing the line between investigatory and noninvestigatory set-
tings. 99 Judicial optimism has nevertheless prevailed in attempting to
distinguish between them.
We are not unmindful of the possibility that irresponsible or overzealous
police officers may attempt to conduct illegal warrantless searches under
the guise of protecting impounded cars and their contents . . . . We are
unwilling to say that the danger of a pretextual search is so great that
we must condemn reasonable steps taken to protect valuable property.
100
2. The Opinion in Opperman
In evaluating the reasonableness of the inventory search in Op-
perman, the Supreme Court relied again upon the concept of the di-
minished expectation of privacy relating to automobiles found in pre-
95. See Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 442-443 (1973) (in which the importance of
standard police procedures was stressed); United States v. Mitchell, 458 F.2d 960 (9th Cir.
1972); United States v. Boyd, 436 F.2d 1203 (5th Cir. 1971); Godbee v. State, 224 So. 2d 441
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969); St. Clair v. State, I Md. App. 605, 232 A.2d 565 (Ct. Spec. App.
1967).
96. "It is surely anomalous to say that the individual and his private property are fully
protected by the Fourth Amendment only when the individual is suspected of criminal be-
havior." Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 530 (1967).
97. For discussions of what constitutes criminal probable cause, see Henry v. United
States, 361 U.S. 98, 102 (1959); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949); Husty
v. United States, 282 U.S. 694, 700-01 (1931).
98. See note 95 supra.
99. Some courts have recognized the difficulty involved in determining actual police mo-
fives. See, e.g., Heffley v. State, 83 Nev. 100, 423 P.2d 666 (1967).
100. United States v. Mitchell, 458 F.2d 960, 963-64 (9th Cir. 1972). The controversy
in Mitchell involved only plain view items; nevertheless, Judge Wright's comments apply to in-
ventory searches in general.
Another way suggested to insure the police were not searching with an ulterior motive
would be to hold any criminal evidence found during an inventory inadmissible. Id. at 966
(Ely, J., dissenting). But this approach was rejected in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 13-15 (1968).
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vious fourth amendment cases. The Court implied that less persua-
sive justifications might be sufficient to determine the reasonableness
of an automobile search involving a "community caretaking func-
tion" as in Opperman, than would suffice for the search of a dwelling.
The justifications relied upon by the Court were those generally ad-
vanced by lower courts as favoring the reasonableness of automobile
inventories:' 0 ' protection of the owner's property; protection of the
police against false claims of theft; and protection of the police from
danger. A fourth justification was added to support the search of the
glove compartment: the protection of the public from firearms and
contraband drugs.10 2 In addition to these justifications, the Court also
relied upon Cooper,0 3 Harris,1°4 and Dombrowski0 5 in upholding the
automobile inventory as a routine police procedure. The Court com-
mented that this result had been reached by the majority of lower
courts, which was certainly true,106 but more important in its analysis
was that "[t]he decisions of this Court point unmistakably to the con-
clusion reached by both federal and state courts that inventories
pursuant to standard police procedures are reasonable."10 7
Cooper v. California suggested that police have a right to search
an impounded automobile for their own protection without a warrant
or probable cause. The presence of the state forfeiture statute im-
pressed the Court in Opperman as a relatively insignificant factor.
"There was, of course, no certainty at the time of the search that
forfeiture proceedings would ever be held. . . . No reason would
therefore appear to limit Cooper to an impoundment pursuant to a
forfeiture statute."
10 8
Harris v. United States, the second case mentioned by the Court,
has been commonly cited as an example of the plain view exception
to the warrant requirement.109  In the Court's reading, however,
Harris permitted the police to protect an automobile in police custody
by means of a noninvestigatory intrusion. This was true even though
the issue of the legality of the inventory was expressly reserved in
Harris.1 Finally, Cady v. Dombrowski was relied upon by the Court
101. See text accompanying notes 72-93 supra.
102. 96 S. Ct. at 3100 n.10.
103. 386 U.S. 58 (1967).
104. 390 U.S. 234 (1968).
105. 413 U.S. 433 (1973).
106. See cases collected in Annot., Lanfulness of "Inventory Search" of Motor Vehicles
Impounded by Police, 48 A.L.R.3d 537 (1973); Comment, 77Te Automobile Inventory Search
and Cady v. Dombrowski, 20 ViLL L. REv. 147, 181-82 (1974) (excellent collections); South
Dakota v. Opperman, 96 S. Ct. 3092, 3097-98 (1976) (less extensiv-e collection).
107. 96 S. Ct. 3092, 3098 (1976).
108. Id. at 3098 n.8.
109. See, e.g., id. at 3100 n.2 (Powell, J., concurring).
110. 390 U.S. 234, 235 (1968).
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for the proposition that where standard department procedures are
followed, the search is likely to be reasonable in scope.m
This reliance upon Cooper and Harris was perhaps unjustified.
Justice Powell's concurrence quarreled with the Court's refusal to
recognize that these cases involved significant factors not found in
Opperman.' In addition, the Court took a large step beyond the
rationale of Dombrowski, in which the Court had permitted the search
of an automobile based upon the actual reasonable belief that the
impounded vehicle contained a police officer's loaded firearm."' In
Opperman none of the justifications offered by the Court were actually
demonstrated in the record. Apparently no specific facts showing
the need to inventory the vehicle were required in finding the in-
ventory reasonable. Thus, Opperman clearly was intended to approve
the automobile inventory as a routine practice, not simply limited to
the exigencies of a particular case.
114
The search of the glove compartment, an area beyond plain view,
was explicitly approved by the Court in Opperman as reasonable.
The defendant had never challenged the inventory of items in plain
view; and Harris had arguably given the police authority to inventory
items left in plain view in a lawfully impounded automobile. Opper-
man argued, however, that an automobile inventory procedure that
allowed police to search an unlocked glove compartment was un-
reasonable in scope. The Supreme Court disagreed. This was, stated
the Court, a reasonable area for a noninvestigatory search to cover.115
The Court noted that lower courts have recognized that the glove
compartment is "a customary place for documents of ownership and
registration . . . as well as a place for the temporary storage of
valuables."'1 6  Extending an otherwise valid search to the glove
compartment was defended as reasonable upon three grounds. Two
of them paralleled the justifications mentioned earlier in the opinion:
the protection of the owner's property from thieves or vandals who
111. 96 S. Ct. 3092, 3099 (1976).
112. Id. at 3100 n.2 (Powell, J., concurring).
113. See text accompanying notes 49-51 supra.
114. For a discussion of the Court's similar response in dealing with searches incident to
arrest in United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973), see Lafave, "Case-by-case Adjudica-
tion" versus "Standardized Procedures" the Robinson Dilemma, 1974 Sup. CT. REv. 127.
115. 96 S. CIL 3092, 3098 (1976). See Comment, The Aftermath of Cooper v. California:
Warrantless Automobile Searches in Illinois, 1968 U. ILL. L.F. 401, 407:
If the purpose of the inventory is to record the valuables and other personal property
found in the car, it would seem unrealistic to limit the search to a superficial inspec-
tion of the vehicle. In view of the fact that a person who does carry valuables in his
car will most probably place them in as safe and inconspicuous place as possible, the
conscientious investigator will conduct as thorough a search as the circumstances
permit.
116. 96 S. Ct. at 3098, citing United States v. Pennington, 441 F.2d 249, 251 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied 404 U.S. 854 (1971).
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"would have had ready and unobstructed access once inside the car,,,117
and the protection of the municipality from claims of lost or stolen
property." 8 The third rationale referred to by the Court in connection
with the glove compartment was the protection of the public from
firearms, as in Dombrowski, or contraband drugs, as in Opperman.
119
Two other factors were crucial to the Court's finding. First, the
standard nature of the procedure was important, for this insured that
the scope of the search would be limited to that appropriate for a
noninvestigatory, "community caretaking" function. Following a
standard procedure in Opperman guaranteed for the Court that the
inventory's scope was tailored to achieve the purposes of the under-
lying justifications. It also lessened the possibility of abuse of police
discretion. 1 0 Second, the Court noted that the motives of the police
were proper. The Court stated several times that "there is no sug-
gestion whatever that this standard procedure . . was a pretext
concealing an investigatory police motive.'
' 21
These two requirements were somewhat interrelated, as the
Court pointed out. Both must probably be shown for the inventory
to be constitutionally valid. The Court hinted that if an investiga-
tory motive were demonstrated, probable cause would be required to
justify the search under traditional fourth amendment analysis. 22
Thus, Opperman did not give unbridled reign to police in conducting
automobile inventories. It held that inventories of vehicles lawfully
in police custody were reasonable without a warrant or probable cause
when the inventory was conducted pursuant to standard department
regulations with no investigatory motive, even if the area searched
was beyond plain view.
The Court in Opperman intended to establish a general rule,
based upon the general cumulative benefits served by an automobile
inventory procedure. Neither protection of the police from specific
danger nor actual concern over possible false claims of theft was
actually relied upon by the police, as the record demonstrated and the
dissent reiterated. 123  Furthermore, the Court admitted that protection
of the owner's property standing alone would not justify the inventory
117. 96 S. Ct. at 3100 n.10.
118. Id.
119. Id. This came perilously close, however, to justifying the search by what it disclosed.
120. Id. at 3099. Standard procedures were stated to be "a factor tending to ensure that
the intrusion would be limited in scope to the extent necessary to carry out the caretaking func-
tion."
121. Id. at 3100.
122. The Court thus implicitly appeared to approve the creation of the very "anomaly"
they rejected in Camara. See note 96 supra. The individual's effects receive more protection
from governmental intrusion when he is suspected of criminal activity. See text accompanying
notes 172-75 infra.
123. 96 S. Ct. at 3106 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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absent some effort to obtain the owner's consent, and no such effort
was made in this case. The holding of Opperman, however, estab-
lished a per se rule regarding inventories of vehicles lawfully in police
custody justified by the general benefits of the procedure rather than
the exigencies of the particular fact pattern.12 4  This provides ad-
vantages of predictability and easier administration. Application of
this per se rule, however, requires the lack of substantial investigatory
motive and the presence of a standard practice. These limitations
suggest that the method of attack in inventory cases in the future
will shift to these requirements. Opperman will not close the door to
all fourth amendment challenges in this area; it should, however,
focus the attention of the courts upon a narrower set of questions in
determining the reasonableness of a particular inventory.
The institution of such a per se rule for automobile inventories
also suggests that the Court was disenchanted with a case-by-case
approach of stricter scrutiny. The costs of that approach imposed by
the exclusionary rule's prohibition of introduction of evidence at trial
is also a likely reason for the Court's opinion.
125
3. Justice Powell's Concurrence
Justice Powell claimed that prior Supreme Court decisions were
not particularly helpful in deciding the reasonableness of the Opper-
man search, contrary to the suggestion of the majority opinion.
126
Powell felt that Harris v. United States only illustrated the "plain
view exception" to the warrant requirement, that Cooper v. California
had been based largely upon the police's possessory interest under the
California forfeiture statute, and that Cady v. Dombrowski had ac-
tually turned on the police's reasonable belief concerning the con-
tents of the automobile.1 27  The reasonableness of the Opperman
search could not be determined in light of these cases, but only by a
weighing of the governmental and societal interests favoring auto-
mobile inventories against the citizen's interest in the privacy of his
effects. 128  Justice Powell proceeded to balance the justifications of
protecting police from danger, police protection against false claims of
theft, and protection of the owner's property against the individual's
privacy interest in his automobile.
Justice Powell was more realistic than the majority in dealing
with the shortcomings of these justifications. He admitted that the
124. This was the same approach followed by the Court in United States v. Robinson,
414 U.S. 218 (1973). See note 114 supra.
125. See text accompanying notes 158-66 infra.
126. 96 S. Ct. at 3100 n.2.
127. Id
128. Id. at 3100-01.
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dangers to police from bombs and explosives were remote, but could
not be ruled out altogether due to the magnitude of possible harmful
consequences. An inability to identify such possibly dangerous auto-
mobiles in advance magnified the problem. Although hesitating to
rely heavily on this justification, Justice Powell warned against dis-
counting it entirely.
Justice Powell also acknowledged that the police in Opperman
had exceeded their legal duty of care under state law as gratuitous
bailees.129 Therefore, he noted the protection against false claims of
loss or theft rationale was inapplicable in Opperman, a fact not men-
tioned by the majority. Even if the police had been charged with a
higher duty of care, Justice Powell questioned the value of inventories
in discouraging false claims, "since there remains the possibility of
accompanying such claims with an assertion that an item was stolen
prior to the inventory or was intentionally omitted from the police
records."
130
The most substantial justification for the inventory procedure in
Justice Powell's opinion was the protection of the owner's property.
It is, he commented, "a significant interest for both the policeman
and the citizen" because of the "substantial gain in security if auto-
mobiles are inventoried and valuable items removed for storage. 131
Police custody may last for several days, and the added protection
afforded valuables justified the inventory process in Justice Powell's
mind.
The privacy interest of the individual needed to be weighed
against these benefits. Powell concluded that the limited scope of a
standard inventory procedure aimed at protecting property did not
constitute an intrusion serious enough to require a finding of un-
reasonableness when balanced by the practice's benefits. Like the
majority, Powell relied heavily upon the fact that the inventory was
limited in scope by compliance with standard department regulations.
A search would be unreasonable in scope were the police to examine
the contents of materials such as letters or checkbooks, which "reveal
much about a person's activities, associations, and beliefs.' 3' The
glove compartment itself, however, was not beyond the scope of such
a limited search. 133 Thus, Powell agreed with the majority's finding
of reasonableness, weighing the factors involved in a more forthright
way.
129. Id. at 3101 n.3.
130. Id. at 3101.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 3102 n.7 (quoting California Bankers Ass'n v. Schultz, 416 U.S. 21, 78 (1974)
(Powell, J., concurring)).
133. 96 S. Ct. at 3102. Justice Powell made clear that the glove compartment could
always be searched in the course of a standard inventory procedure, and not only when there
were items in plain view prompting the search as in Opperman.
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III. THE DISSENTING OPINIONS
A. Justice Marshall's Dissent
The four dissenters disputed the Court's determination of rea-
sonableness in Opperman. Justice Marshall first concurred with
Justice Powell that the inventory in this case involved a search.
Quoting the language of Camara v. Municipal Court, 3 4 Justice
Marshall readily agreed that "[ilt is surely anomalous to say that the
individual and his private property are fully protected by the Fourth
Amendment only when the individual is suspected of criminal be-
havior." 115 Justice Marshall claimed that he did not need to consider
the necessity of a warrant in such a case.1 36 He did, however, choose
to criticize the Court's analysis of the reasonableness of the inventory
search in Opperman.
Justice Marshall agreed that in some past cases automobiles had
been treated differently than homes, "but even as the Court's discussion
makes clear, the reasons for distinction in those cases are not present
here." 137  Having dissented in Cardwell v. Lewis,138 Cady v. Dom-
browski, Chambers v. Maroney, and Cooper v. California, he was not
inclined to allow further relaxation of the fourth amendment as it
applied to automobiles.
Justice Marshall first contended that the diminished expectation
of privacy associated with automobiles referred to by the Court had
never meant that the search of an automobile could be upheld by a
less compelling justification than was necessary for the search of a
home. The diminished privacy expectation, asserted Justice Marshall,
only involves a sacrifice of some privacy interest to the publicity of
plain view while travelling; thus, the standards by which a search must
be justified are the same for automobiles and dwellings. Plain view
items were not involved in the Opperman dispute. Therefore, Jus-
tice Marshall suggested that the justifications favoring the inventory
must be persuasive enough to outweigh the strong fourth amendment
interest in the privacy of one's effects.
Justice Marshall protested, however, that the justifications relied
upon in Opperman were not applicable to the facts in the case.
Nothing in the record suggested that the police were using the in-
ventory to determine ownership of the vehicle. In fact no attempt
was made to contact the owner. The record also made clear that
the protection of the police from danger was not relied upon. There
was no indication that "the officer's search in this case was tailored in
134. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
135. Id. at 530.
136. 96 S. Ct. 3092, 3104 and 3108 n.15 (1976).
137. Id. at 3105.
138. 417 U.S. 583 (1973). Cardwell is discussed briefly in note 68 supra.
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any way to safety concerns, or that ordinarily it is so circumscribed."'"
Even if relied upon, however, Justice Marshall concluded that this
justification would hardly be persuasive.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court of South Dakota had ruled that
the police only owed a duty of slight care to the owner under state law.
Since this could have been satisfied by securing items in plain view
and locking doors, 40 protection against claims of loss or theft could
not justify the search. "Moreover, . . . it may well be doubted that
an inventory procedure would in any event work significantly to mini-
mize the frustrations of false claims."'
14
'
Nor did protection of the public from firearms or contraband
drugs justify the search according to Justice Marshall. Not only
was this not relied upon in prompting the Opperman search, but Justice
Marshall felt that "[i]f this asserted rationale justifies search of all
impounded automobiles, it must logically also justify the search of all
automobiles, whether impounded or not, located in a similar area,
for the argument is not based upon the custodial role of the police.
142
Justice Marshall's argument on this point is weakened, however, if
one realizes that all automobiles are not as vulnerable to thieves and
vandals as are automobiles parked in an unattended impound lot.
Finally, Justice Marshall concluded that the protection of the
owner's property, although a significant interest, did not of its own
weight justify a routine inventory procedure for impounded automo-
biles. Since such a search would be for the owner's benefit, it would
require either obtaining the consent of the owner, or exceptional cir-
cumstances of necessity. Because no attempt had been made in Op-
perman to contact the owner, and no exceptional circumstances had
been shown, the search of an area beyond plain view had been, in
Justice Marshall's opinion, unreasonable and contrary to fourth
amendment standards.
Justice Marshall's strategy in dissent was to divide and conquer
the majority's justifications. He pointed out their weaknesses one by
one. The majority, however, had made clear that no one justification
alone was, or should be, relied upon to uphold the inventory, for the
benefits of these justifications, when aggregated, exceeded their ap-
parent value when isolated and examined individually. Their cumu-
lative benefits, particularly when applied to all cases, undergirded the
majority's finding of reasonableness. Justice Marshall's failure to
address this aspect of the majority's reasoning weakened his criticism
of the Court's opinion in Opperman.
139. 96 S. Ct. at 3106.
140. State v. Opperman, 228 N.W.2d 152, 159 (S.D. 1975).
141. 96 S. Ct. at 3107.
142. Id. at 3107 n.8 (emphasis in original).
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Justice Marshall ended by reminding the state court that on re-
mand it was not required to adopt the Court's reasoning, if it felt that
the South Dakota constitution provided a basis for a contrary resolu-
tion. The states may, of course, adopt stricter standards above the
federal constitutional floor established by the United States Supreme
Court. In his dissent in Oregon v. Hass 43 Justice Marshall had sug-
gested that in overruling state courts on constitutional grounds in
criminal cases the Supreme Court should be hesitant to presume that
only the federal, and not the state constitution was the basis for the
decision. State courts should "be asked rather than told what they
intended,"' 44 unless clear and decisive in the record, for "[ilt is
peculiarly within the competence of the highest court of a state to
determine that in its jurisdiction the police should be subject to
more stringent rules than are required as a federal constitutional
minimum." 45 Justice Brennan, who joined Justice Marshall's dissent,
has strongly agreed. In a recent law review article he urged state
courts to exercise their power under state constitutions to protect
individual liberties.
46
On remand the South Dakota court did reinstate its previous
opinion, basing this decision upon the South Dakota constitution.
The court held that an inventory was reasonable only if "it was con-
ducted without investigative motive and its scope was limited to
things within plain view."1
47
B. Justice White's Dissent
Justice White's dissenting vote is initially surprising when his
opinions concerning the fourth amendment,-and particularly the war-
rant clause, are considered.148  He joined in the Court's opinions in
Cady v. Dombrowski and Cardwell v. Lewis, both of which gave some
support to the idea of an automobile exception. In Almeida-Sanchez
v. United States149 Justice White outlined his view of the fourth
amendment standard:
As the Court has reaffirmed today in Cady v. Dombrowski, . . .the
governing standard under the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness, and
143. 420 U.S. 714, 726 (1975) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
144. Id. at 727 (quoting Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 128 (1945)).
145. Id. at 728.
146. Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARv. L.
REv. 489 (1977). See also 62 A.B.A.J. 993.
147. State v. Opperman, 247 N.W.2d 673, 675 (S.D. 1976).
148. See, e.g., Justice Whites broad reading of another exception to the %varrant re-
quirement, search incident to arrest during a station house inventory, in United States v. Ed-
wards, 415 U.S. 800 (1974), despite the fact that the justifications for allowing the exception
were not present in that case.
149. 413 U.S. 266 (1973).
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in my view, that standard is sufficiently flexible to authorize the search
involved in this case.
The Court has been particularly sensitive to the amendment's broad
standard of 'reasonableness' where ...authorizing statutes permitted
the challenged searches.15 0"
He further pointed out in Chambers v. Maroney that "[iln terms of
the circumstances justifying a warrantless search, the Court has long
distinguished between an automobile and a home or office."'' One
would expect that Justice White's "flexible" view of the fourth amend-
ment, particularly since an automobile was involved and the search was
authorized or permitted by a standard department regulation, would
have led to his joining the majority. His failure -to do so is something
of an enigma.
Justice White pointed out that his dissenting vote rested upon his
agreement with Justice Marshall's analysis of the specific cause re-
quirement, not Justice Marshall's statements regarding consent.
52
Justice White had said in Camara v. Municipal Court that "[tihe
basic purpose of this amendment . .. is to safeguard the privacy and
security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental
officials." 153  Even where building inspections were performed by a
state regulatory agency, Justice White felt an analog to criminal
probable cause was necessary before the search was permissible.
1 4
His "flexibility" is apparently limited to the area where some type
of probable cause is present. Thus, a noninvestigatory search based
only upon general policy considerations, such as Opperman, did not
satisfy, in Justice White's mind, the fourth amendment requirement
of reasonableness. A warrant is never required for an automobile
search, according to White, if probable cause is present. 5 ' As in
Terry v. Ohio, Justice White probably would require some "specific
and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences
from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion." 156  Such facts
150. Id. at 289-90.
151. 399 U.S. 42, 48 (1970).
152. "I do not subscribe to all of my Brother Marshall's dissenting opinion, particularly
some aspects of his discussion concerning the necessity for obtaining the consent of the car
owner. . . ." 96 S. Ct. at 3109 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White's dissent must then have
been based upon agreement with Justice Marshall's insistence upon a showing of specific facts
justifying the search in each case.
153. 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967) (emphasis added).
154. Id. at 538.
155. Justice White's statement in Coolidge v. New Hampshire made this clear:
"[S]earches of vehicles on probable cause but without a warrant have been deemed reasonable
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment without requiring proof of exigent circumstances
beyond the fact that a movable vehicle is involved." 403 U.S. 443, 524 (1971) (White, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part).
156. 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968).
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were present in Dombrowski, Chambers, and Lewis. They were not
present in Opperman. "[T]he police in this case had no reason to be-
lieve that the glove compartment of the impounded car contained
particular property . *...,, It was this failure that led to Justice
White's somewhat surprising dissent.
IV. A FURTHER BASIS FOR THE DECISION
In establishing a general rule allowing police inventories of im-
pounded automobiles in Opperman, Justice Marshall charged that the
Court was elevating "mere possibilities of property interests...
above the privacy and security interests protected by the Fourth
Amendment." 58 This was not, however, in all likelihood the actual
motivation for the majority result. The opinion of the Court itself
suggested a further reason prompting the result, unmentioned by the
Court in explicit terms.
In laying the foundation for its opinion, the Court through Chief
Justice Burger quoted Justice Black's dissent in Coolidge v. New
Hampshire59 approving reasonableness as the relevant test for fourth
amendment purposes. In looking to the late Justice Black as an
authority on fourth amendment issues, the Chief Justice could hardly
have been unaware of Justice Black's other opinions regarding en-
forcement of the fourth amendment, as he had expressed them earlier
in that same Coolidge dissent.
The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and sei-
zures. The Amendment says nothing about consequences. It certainly
nowhere provides for the exclusion of evidence as the remedy for viola-
tion. . . .The truth is that the source of the exclusionary rule simply
cannot be found in the Fourth Amendment....
By invoking this rulemaking power not found in the words but
somewhere in the 'spirit' of the Fourth Amendment, the Court has
expanded that amendment beyond recognition. And each new step isjustified as merely a logical extension of the step before.160
It was not a mere coincidence that Black's opinion quoted by the
majority also contained this bitter diatribe against the exclusionary
rule. Others on the Court have at times expressed their displeasure
regarding the rule's functioning.161 On the same day that Opperman
157. 96 S. Ct. at 3109 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
158. Id.
159. 403 U.S. 443, 493 (1971) (Black, J., concurring and dissenting).
160. Id. at 496, 497, 499 (Black, J., concurring and dissenting).
161. Perhaps the classic statement to date has been Chief Justice Burger's dissent in
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 411 (1971) (Burger, CJ., dissenting).
Chief Justice Burger's most recent expression of displeasure with the Courts' utilization of the
exclusionary rule is found in his dissent in Brewer v. Williams, 97 S. Ct. 1232, 1248 (1977)
(Burger, CJ., dissenting).
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was handed down, the Court also decided Stone v. Powell,162 holding
that "where the State has provided an opportunity for full and fair
litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim, a state prisoner may not be
granted federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that evidence ob-
tained in an unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at
trial."'163  In his concurrence in that case Chief Justice Burger made
explicit his disinclination to allow the exclusionary rule continued
vitality in its present form.
Its function is simple-the exclusion of truth from the fact-finding pro-
cess ....
...It is now used almost exclusively to exclude from evidence
articles which are unlawful to be possessed or tools and instruments of
crime. Unless it can be rationally thought that the Framers considered
it essential to protect the liberties of the people to hold that which it is
unlawful to possess, then it becomes clear that our constitutional course
has taken a most bizarre tack.
164
Both Chief Justice Burger and Justice White agreed that the rule should
be modified in order to prevent its application to circumstances in
which the officer in question had a reasonable, good faith belief in the
lawfulness of his conduct. 65  There has been sentiment to eliminate
the rule where bad faith is not involved.
166
In Opperman the police were not involved in a bad faith attempt
to short circuit the fourth amendment. Investigatory motives, which
conceivably might initiate such an attempt, were not present. The
police were involved in a benign caretaking function, which as a
routine practice had value to the community and to the police. To
"exclude from evidence articles which are unlawful to be possessed"
in such a situation was viewed by the majority in Opperman as
"bizarre." But since it was not willing to explicitly limit the exclusion-
ary rule, the Court instead reached its desired result by a liberal con-
struction of the definition of reasonableness, and by a further extension
of the warrant exceptions. Justice Black's fear of fourth amendment
expansion beyond recognition was met by a watering down of the
substantive aspect of the amendment itself, leaving the exclusionary
rule intact. The Court's analysis in Opperman seemed somewhat
insufficient to the dissenters, but antipathy toward the practical re-
sults of the exclusionary rule helps to explain the decision.
162. 96 S. Ct. 3037 (1976).
163. Id. at 3052.
164. Id. at 3053.
165. Id. at 3055, 3072.
166. See Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 446-48 (1974).
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A UTOMOBILE INVENTORIES
V. THE IMPACT OF THE DECISION
The result in Opperman was not surprising. "The decisions of
this Court point unmistakably to the conclusions reached by both
federal and state courts that inventories pursuant to standard police
procedures are reasonable."1 67 In Opperman, however, the Supreme
Court for the first time explicitly gave a green light to state and lower
federal courts interested in admitting evidence obtained in a non-
investigatory intrusion carried out according to standard police de-
partment regulations.
Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to read Opperman too broadly.
The Court made clear that the decision authorized a police inventory
only of vehicles lawfully impounded or otherwise in lawful police
custody.1 68  There must be no pretext concealing an investigatory
motive. Standard police procedures were adjudged a necessary factor
in the determination of reasonableness. The search of a trunk was
not involved in Opperman, although the rationale of the case could
well extend itself to that situation. The facts should not apply to
the constitutionality of opening locked cases or sealed packages.
Justice Powell suggested that valuables might only be removed for
safekeeping, not examination.1 69  Finally, Opperman was further re-
moved from the criminal law context than many cases. It was fairly
easy in Opperman to find the complete absence of investigatory motive.
But very few cases involving inventories have arisen because of il-
legally parked motor vehicles; most litigation has involved inventories
following the arrest of the driver.170  The police will have to satisfy
the courts that there was no investigatory motive in such a situation
before Opperman will allow an inventory to be declared reasonable.
Although Opperman was clearly not intended to be limited to its facts,
an authorization of inventories as a means by which the fourth
amendment may be circumvented in all situations was clearly not
contemplated, and courts since Opperman have not so read the case.
171
Indeed, it might actually be argued that Opperman limited pre-
vious case law regarding inventory searches. Many cases had pre-
viously allowed inventories whenever an impounded vehicle was
involved, even though something approaching criminal probable cause
was involved. 172  After Opperman, automobile searches should prob-
167. 96 S. Ct. at 3098.
168. Id. at 3095. Lawful custody has in the past been seen as crucial in upholding
automobile inventories. See United States v. Pannell, 256 A.2d 925 (D.C. App. 1969) (lawful
custody of vehicle required before protective inventory permitted).
169. 96 S. Ct. at 3102.
170. See Annot., Lawfulness of "Inventory Search" of Motor Vehicle Impounded by
Police, 48 A.L.R.3d 537, 558-66 (1973).
171. See, e.g., Altman v. State, 335 So. 2d 626 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
172. !-g., United States v. Kelehar, 470 F.2d 176 (5th Cir. 1972).
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ably be divided into three categories. First, where probable cause
is present pre-Opperman case law will control, probably allowing the
search without a warrant. Second, where no connection whatsoever
with the criminal law is demonstrated and the finding of evidence
of criminal activity is purely a surprise, Opperman will authorize
the inventory as reasonable without a warrant under the fourth amend-
ment if standard procedures have been followed.11 3  Third, where
there is some basis for arguing that the police were searching for
evidence of crime, investigation based upon mere suspicion should be
foreclosed by the result and its attendant rationale. Critics have
argued that such a tripartite division stands the fourth amendment
upside down, protecting those who are suspected of criminal activity,
but not those who are free from suspicion. 174 Nevertheless, since the
Court has expressed its intention to use the exclusionary rule primarily
to deter bad faith police conduct, 175 this appears to be the intended
result.
VI. CONCLUSION
South Dakota v. Opperman demonstrated the Burger court's in-
terest in softening the impact of the exclusionary rule when the police
have acted in good faith. It also enlarged the exceptions to the
fourth amendment's warrant requirement. The Opperman inventory
per se rule allowed factors of general applicability to dictate the
result in a particular case. In light of the previous automobile cases
of Dombrowski, Lewis, Harris, and Cooper, Opperman makes clear
the direction of the Court in fourth amendment automobile cases.
There is still no "seamless web" 176 in this area of fourth amendment
law, but it does seem clear that, due to the onerous consequences of
enforcing the exclusionary rule, there will continue to be, as Justice
White stated, "a constitutional difference between houses and cars."'"7
John W. Cook, III
173. The police procedures themselves must not be unreasonable in scope. It is reason-
able to assume that courts will require the inventory procedure. followed to bear some con-
nection with the justifications supporting them. Justice Powell has given clear warning that
the standard procedures would allow the search only if they limited the scope of an officer's dis-
cretion. See text accompanying note 132 supra.
174. See, e.g., 7 U. RICH. L. REV. 151, 159 (1972).
175. See text accompanying notes 165-66 supra.
176. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 440 (1973). See text accompanying note 3 supra.
177. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 52 (1970).
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